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ABSTRACT 
Consumers are getting increasingly concerned about food quality. Associated with 
this, public and private sectors have been enforcing compliance with strict food standards. 
This study focuses on the strategic response of Brazilian beef chain to comply with food 
standards and their attributes, specifically those demanding trustworthiness among partners. 
From a chain perspective, the study characterises both the Brazilian domestic and export 
markets. The empirical approach employed in the study is based on qualitative methods with 
case studies. The results have great policy and managerial implications. Emerging public and 
private standards are demanding changes to a more integrated supply chain in order to 
enhance confidence in beef production and processing. Findings describe those kinds of 
governance that stimulate upgrading and transferring of best practices and, consequently, 
result on more trustworthiness on chain relationships. From a managerial perspective, the 
results suggest that tight governance and investments in management capacity to new forms 
of organisation have to be considered.  
Keywords: food standards – trustworthiness – chain governance – beef chain – supply 
chain 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries are important players in food production and marketing. In 
general, their agri-food chains are still relying on traditional spot market relationships and old 
business practices. In order to comply with regulation and certifications, it is necessary 
changes in the relationships within the supply chains. An example is Brazil, where efforts 
have been made by public and private sectors to upgrade public policies; particularly on those 
focusing on export sectors. Relevant literature points out the development of trustworthiness 
partnerships and alliances as the best way to comply with these standards (CASWELL, 2003; 
LINDGREEN, 2003). This paper identifies different kinds of chain governance and describes 
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how they stimulate the development of trust within chain’s members to allow full compliance 
with food standards. The next section discusses the theoretical framework based on global 
commodity chains approach and defines trust. Then, section 3 describes the method applied in 
this research. Section 4 summarises the Brazilian food policy and section 5 presents the case 
studies carried out. Section 5 discusses the main findings and draws the main implications of 
this study. 
 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
It is fundamental the identification of the agent responsible for the setting and 
monitoring of the standards, particularly when considering a global food chain. In this way, 
this section reviews the literature about governance from a developing country perspective. 
Next, it is considered the importance of trustworthiness within a supply chain. Therefore, a 
link between governance and trust is proposed. 
 
2.1 Governance 
Global Commodity Chain (GCC) is a method of analysis focusing on power within 
global production and the spread of manufacturing over developing countries. Gereffi (1994) 
differentiates two types of governance structure: producer driven and buyer driven. The first 
structure means a chain where a large company (usually transnational) co-ordinate the whole 
supply chain and is characterised by capital and technology intensive industries. Here, the 
main strategy is to attain economies of scale on the manufacturing. Traditional examples are 
automobile companies such as Ford and General Motors. Conversely, buyer-driven chains 
focus on the domination of retail companies and brand-named merchandisers. These compete 
intensively against each other on continuing minor innovations to products and packaging, on 
the maintenance of strict quality criteria and on price. Traditional examples are UK 
supermarkets, Nike and Reebok (GEREFFI, 1999; DOLAN and HUMPHREY, 2000; 
KAPLINSKY, 2000). These companies are merchandisers that design or market the products 
that they sell. The key agent (the “lead”) delegates, manages and enforces the production 
process to ensure that its supply chain really complies.  
Gereffi (1994) recognises that both systems, the buyer and the producer driven, may 
be contrasting, but not mutually exclusive. Large companies play the role of the governor 
creating and monitoring their own standards. They can be manufacturers detaining 
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technological and production information (producer-driven) or retailers or branded companies 
concentrating on the possession and “translation” of market information.  
Dolan and Humphrey (2000) described the governance exercised by UK supermarkets on the 
production and processing of fresh vegetables in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Their findings 
showed chains governed by supermarkets searching for increased product differentiation.  
The governor of the chain, i.e. the establisher of the standards, should have sufficient 
size and capacity to monitor the standards, while the supplier should have the capacity to 
invest to meet the standards. However, Dolan and Humphrey (2000) showed that processors 
in developing countries had difficulties in meeting the requirements of UK supermarkets 
(food safety, environment, labour). Being chain “governor” increases the responsibility of the 
retailer for occurrences in the supply chain. Consequently, such supermarkets develop and 
aim to hold capabilities that can develop competing chains worldwide. 
Kaplinsky (2000) identifies three possible forms of governance. The first is legislative 
governance, where the basic rules are set that define the conditions for participation in the 
chain. Judicial governance means an audit of performance and monitoring of compliance. A 
more proactive form of governance is executive, which provides assistance to chain members 
to meet the proceedings. Governance can be provided from within, or without, the chain. 
These three categories are summarised in the next table:     
 
Table 1: Examples of Legislative, Judicial and Executive Governance 
Kinds of Governance Exercised by parties internal 
to chain 
Exercised by parties external 
to chain 
Legislative  governance 
 
*Setting standards for suppliers 
in relation to on-time deliveries, 
frequency of deliveries and 
quality 
*Environmental standards; 
*Child labour standards 
Judicial governance 
 
*Monitoring the performance of 
suppliers in meeting these 
standards 
*Monitoring of labour standards 
by NGOs; 
*Specialised firms monitoring 
conformance to ISO standards 
Executive governance 
 
*Supply Chain Management 
assisting suppliers to meet 
standards; 
*Producer associations assisting 
members to meet these 
standards 
*Specialised service providers 
*Government industrial policy 
support 
Source: Adapted from Kaplinsky, 2000. 
 
The table above describes the different roles played by different agents in the 
establishment and/or monitoring of standards. It is fundamental to identify the responsible 
for these tasks and to understand chain dynamics. The governor can be considered the chain 
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“strategist”. He is the one who determines the future of the chain. From the above table, 
obvious links can be seen between governance and standards. The international organisations 
responsible for the establishment of standards (WTO, Codex Alimentarius and OIE) would 
exemplify the legislative governance. The judicial governance is the enforcement of standards 
made by national governments. Finally, the executive governance relies on private standards. 
Governance can be therefore be exercised in different ways and through different agents along 
the length of the entire food supply process depending on the kind of standards existent.  
 
2.2. Trust 
There are many definitions of trust found across a large range of disciplines. The 
definition used in this paper is trust seen as “the extent to which one believes that others will 
not act to exploit one’s vulnerabilities” (MORROW et al., 2004). Trust involves, at least, two 
agents: the trustor has trust in something (organisation, product, institution) or someone – the 
trustee (ZUCKER, 1986; LANE, 1998; NOOTEBOOM, 2002). Thus, trustworthiness is the 
perception held by one party that another party is worthy of trust.  
Trust is considered difficult to measure. To attempt to solve this, Zucker (1986) proposes 
different levels of trust to be represented as in the following table: 
 
Table 2: Different Levels of Trust 
Level/Basis Source Examples 
Characteristics based trust  
(Micro level trust) – based 
on common characteristics 
such as ethnicity, family 
background and culture. 
Family background, ethnicity, 
sex. 
Membership of 
professional 
associations, 
educational 
achievements. 
Institutions based trust  
(Macro level trust) – based 
on codes or guarantees that 
the transaction will take 
place as promised. 
Professional firm, associations, 
regulation, bureaucracy. 
 
Technical/professional 
standards, 
benchmarking. 
Process based trust  
(Meso level trust) – based 
on past exchange 
experience or future 
expectations. 
Reputations, brands, gift giving. Mutual adaptation, 
learning by doing, 
routinisation. 
Adapted from Zucker, 1986 and Nooteboom, 2002. 
 
A clear definition of who is the trustor is fundamental for a full comprehension of 
trust, as organisations have no ability to trust; only individuals within organisation have this 
ability (MORROW et al., 2004). Batt (2000:76) asks who does the seller trust, the salesperson 
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or the sales organization? Personal relationships are extremely important for the formation of 
trust and this factor should be considered when analysing business transactions.  
In a business transaction, trust is a valuable strategic variable that impacts on timely 
deliveries that conform to specifications, general reliability, know-how of production 
requirements, valuable information about the market, among others (LINDGREEN, 2003). 
Trust can also be a reducer of asymmetric information, not only in long-term relationships, 
but also in any kind of transaction (AKERLOFF, 1970). 
Considering previous research, trust can be classified into two dimensions, cognitive 
and affective. Cognitive trust depends on the success of past interaction, the extent of social 
similarity and the context (MCALLISTER, 1995; MORROW et al., 2004). People choose 
who or what they will trust through a process of careful and methodical thought in order to 
determine whether someone or something is trustworthy. Thus, the main point is how one 
develops good reasons to be trusted. 
Affect-based trust refers to one’s instincts, intuition or feelings concerning whether 
something or someone is trustworthy (MORROW et al., 2004). It assumes goodwill and an 
absence of opportunism. The bases for this kind of trust are emotional bonds between agents 
or individual. These occur as a result of social similarities such as ethnic background. 
McAllister (1995) shows that some level of cognitive based-trust is necessary for 
affective trust to develop. When two agents have established frequent reliable and dependable 
transactions, and cognitive trust exists, this can evolve into affective trust. The author 
indicates two important points about the development of the relationship. First, affect based 
trust should be viewed as a distinct form of interpersonal trust rather than as a higher level of 
trust. The second consideration is that once a high level of affective trust has developed, a 
foundation of cognitive trust may no longer be needed. 
 
2.3 Food Standards 
There are several kinds of food standards, some with distinct aims and some 
overlapping in its functions. First, it is important to clarify which attributes the standards are 
related to. The next figure relates the attributes with to the level of information asymmetry 
between buyer and supplier: 
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Search Attributes Experience Attributes Credence Attributes 
Qualities, which are known 
before purchase 
Qualities, which are known after 
purchase 
Qualities, which are difficult to 
evaluate but the buyer can rely 
on third-party judgments 
Increasing information asymmetry 
 
Figure 1: Product Attributes 
 
Search attributes are those that consumers can evaluate before purchasing. Experience 
attributes are those for which consumers can evaluate only when consuming the product. 
Credence attributes are those for which the consumption does not bring information on the 
quality (for example the use of pesticides). Because customers cannot detect credence 
attributes, extrinsic cues must be used to indicate the presence of these attributes. As extrinsic 
cues have nothing to do with the physical product, experience cannot be used to judge if the 
product contains the necessary attributes. In this case there is a need for reputation or labelling 
that the customer can trust. Here, it is proposed that attributes will affect the kind of 
relationship necessary to comply with.  
Based on this review, this paper proposes a link between the kind of governance 
exercised within the chain and the basis of the production of trust. In this way, a trustee agent 
can produce trustworthiness throughout its supply chain. This is fundamental to assure food 
safety within a food chain. In sum, different kinds of governance strategically can be used to 
produce trust while aiming a full compliance with specific food standards.  
 
3 METHOD 
This qualitative study focuses on the Brazilian beef chain, which has been increasingly 
important for the country’s economy. The country has been increasing its exports to several 
countries, which were valued at more than US$ 1 billion in 2002 and 2003. Brazilian beef 
processing is characterised by nationally owned companies, differently from other important 
food sectors dominated by transnationals (JANK et al, 2001). The study analyses two 
different beef marketing channels. This study present results of nine case studies, five of 
export and four of supermarkets. The first marketing channel focuses on five case studies 
about chains exporting beef to the European Union. The second market is represented by 
supermarkets’ own brand beef chain. The key issues of this analysis are the characterisation of 
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each channel, identifying the role of the governor, the standards enforced and the impact on 
the production of trust.  
Firstly, the Brazilian food policy is described through a rapid appraisal with experts 
and secondary data. Then, case studies have been carried out based on a questionnaire derived 
from the literature review. The in-depth interviews were conducted and analysed by this 
researcher, and then discussed with experts. A preliminary report was sent to the key persons 
and to some of the case studies interviewees to confirm the information gathered and check 
validity. The use of multiple sources (in-depth interviews, annual reports, secondary data and 
direct observation) also aimed the construct validity. Any claim was supported with multiple 
evidences when possible (MILES AND HUBERMAN, 1994). The software NVIVO helped 
to group and related the concepts of trust and applications on the interviews made. The 
interviews were conducted with individual firms, but the analysis try do see them in a chain 
context. Thus, all the information gathered was analysed in the wider context, identifying the 
links and relationships between the agents of the chain aiming to “design” and “understand” 
each chain in a more dynamic approach. The last step was a cross-cases analysis to note 
patterns and contrasts between the cases to answer the study questions. 
 
4 BRAZILIAN FOOD POLICY 
The occurrence of relevant food scares throughout Europe and their impact on demand 
has led consumers to require information about the safety of the food. Processors and retailers 
have been trying to recover consumer trust on food. Demand and supply have made food 
safety a priority encouraging the establishment of international food safety rules. In sum, food 
safety standards are determinants of beef trade.  
In Brazil, the Ministry of Agricultural and Food Supply (MAPA) is composed of four 
Major offices, called secretarias. The Ministry has the competence to regulate the production, 
marketing, import and export of fresh and semi-processed agricultural and food products. The 
Ministry's regulatory activities about food standards are enforced by Office of Agricultural 
Protection (SDA), the office responsible for enforcing regulations governing domestic and 
imported plants and animals, and their respective products and by-products, and certain other 
agriculturally related products. In co-operation with State governments, SDA administers 
Federal laws and regulations. This Office also co-ordinates the Brazilian government 
positions in international forums such as WTO, OIE and CODEX.  
The regulation and controlling of food quality and safety is dispersed over several 
public institutions. But despite of the efforts of these Governmental institutions to apply a 
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modern sanitary regulation, all the interviewees agree that there are little qualified people to 
inspect and control the implementation of the requirements within food processing. 
Salay and Caswell (1998) criticise the Brazilian food policy because it focuses largely 
on registering food products and establishments. There are few inspections and sanctions to 
those that violated the law. Brazilian food control policies are more influenced by the 
requirements of international trade than by domestic concerns on public health. The 
government emphasizes safety controls for food products destined to export and those are 
well understood by exporting companies. In contrast, there is a lack of efforts on education, 
control and prevention on the domestic food supply. As consequence, these authors identify a 
process of exclusion with public certification for products with superior quality while 
domestic consumers have little access to products meeting safety standards.   
 
5. CASE STUDIES 
 
5.1 Export chain Cases 
Some brief descriptions of the five chains studies are presented below. 
 
CHAIN A 
This chain consists of a large and vertically integrated beef producer and processor to comply 
with traceability. The processor could not develop suppliers’ interest on adhering and decided 
to supply its own inputs. The compliance is inspected by the MAPA. A German wholesaler 
imports using spot market relations. There is no contract or trust in the relationship, which is 
ruled by INCOTERMS (international commercial terms). 
 
CHAIN B 
This chain consists of an organic beef supplier vertically integrated backwards to fully comply 
with organic standards. This company could not motivate any local beef producer to change 
the production system from conventional to organic. The Dutch importer gave assistance to 
obtain the certification valid in the EU. There is no contract but there is cognitive trust and 
shared plans. A certifying body inspects the compliance with standards. 
 
CHAIN C 
This chain consists of a beef processor that developed business relationships with selected 
local producers. The aim was to comply with traceability and Hilton quota standards. The 
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relationship is based on affective trust. The importer is an UK wholesaler that sources 
worldwide and distributes beef to restaurants and industrial kitchens. Their relationship is 
based on spot market. MAPA is the agent responsible for the inspection. 
 
CHAIN D 
This chain consists of a beef processor that purchases on spot market. This brings difficulties 
on following export standards. Recently, the processor established two systems to qualify and 
have loyal suppliers but the results have been below expected. The Italian wholesaler also 
purchase in a spot market form. There is no trust involved in this relationship. 
 
CHAIN E 
This chain is formed by a group of farmers that vertically integrated forward and process beef 
under their own brand. This group also develop alliances based on affective trust with local 
farmers to supply a genetically improved livestock. On the other hand, the group export to a 
Chilean supermarket on spot market transactions. 
 
In general, Brazilian beef exporters are large-scale processors and family-run business. 
The existence of contracts is still seen as dangerous. One of the reasons is the fluctuation of 
the exchange currency rate in Brazil. This results on exporters acting as gamblers, earning or 
losing money against the currency fluctuation. The existence of a contract would mean that 
they would have to comply with a fixed price on the long term. And, because of successive 
economic in the last 20 years, there is uncertainty of which will be the exchange rate in the 
short term. Then, vertical integration and spot market are still the most common form of co-
ordination. Importers decide to purchase Brazilian beef based on 1) little number of exporter 
countries 2) low price. It is a common strategy for beef importers to source from more than 
one country. This is done to cope with risk of a disease outbreak. EU importers are mainly 
wholesalers distributing to hotels, restaurants and cafes (HERECA). The country of origin is 
not an important issue for these channels. It is difficult to access traditional channels such as 
supermarkets and butchers.  
The investigation of the cases confirmed the existence of opportunistic behaviour 
between farmers and processors indicated in previous literature (Silva and Batalha, 2000). But 
chains are responding to this in different ways. One case does not regard the development of 
trust as a strategy. In case study “A”, where the use of vertical integration happens because of 
mistrust generated by, for example, bad past experience of delayed or non-payments and bad 
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quality inputs. Vertical integration increases the control of one part of a business in another 
part of the same business, although it is not a guarantee of right input. Conversely, the 
processor analysed in case study “E” started as a farmer and integrates vertically downstream 
aiming to add value to his production. This processor uses a quasi-integration strategy to 
attract suppliers working under the same quality of production, process and breed. 
Alternatively, processor “C” has been trying to develop hybrid forms of co-ordination in order 
to have available high quality inputs to attend to the customers’ orders. He chose 50 suppliers 
based on having a friendship and similar background and gives them a preferential treatment. 
The affective trust is easily generated when managers and farmers live in small towns where 
they have an important role in the community. This creates trustworthiness to expand these 
personal relationships to the business environment. The formation of hybrid forms can be 
considered a survival strategy (only alternative) for these companies staying in the 
supermarket and export market. The essential point is not joining strengths as suggested by 
Child and Faulkner (1998), but the compliance with the new “rules of the game”. These are 
the enforcement of quality and safety assurance throughout chain integration. 
Conversely, processors and importers use spot markets even though there is cognitive 
trust about the compliance of standards, price and delivery conditions. Having different 
business cultures does not alter their belief that the transaction will be successful and repeated 
in the future. Importers stand by the view that MAPA is responsible for monitoring the 
process of the beef according to the international regulation that the Brazilian government 
enforces. The processors believe that importers will not try to renegotiate the terms of trade. It 
is a professional relationship, based on documents such as e-mails, fax, letters or orders. 
Reputation is an important issue. The use of international trade terms also helps to standardise 
what are the obligations and the rights of both parties. 
In discussing the cases, it is possible to identify trust as playing two roles. The first 
role is the existence of it (previously) motivating the formation of the hybrid form. This 
occurs in cases where affective trust encourages companies to enter into a closer relationship. 
The second role is where the trust is the aim of the relationship. This appears specifically in 
the cases where cognitive trust is involved. 
The governor of the chain is the link that has power to set price and standards. In all 
cases, exporters are not able to set prices. The only exception is the organic beef (Chain B) 
case, where the processor can negotiate better prices (around 5% more than market prices). 
Mostly, Brazilian beef is sold for 5% less than other competitors’ countries (Australia and 
Argentina). Again, in this case, organic beef processor is an exception. Beef importers 
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exercises legislative governance (KAPLINSKY, 2000) characterised by setting of standards 
about transaction terms. Thus, importers assume that MAPA is the responsible for 
monitoring the full processing and he inspects, randomly, the final product. 
Differently, processors and importers developed a cognitive trust related to the 
compliance of standards. Even that they come from different business cultures there is a belief 
that the transaction will succeed and repeat in the future. Importers trust that MAPA is 
responsible for monitoring the process according to the international regulation (institutional 
trust). And processors believe that importers will not try to renegotiate the terms of trade 
(process trust). It is professional relationship, documented on e-mails, fax, letters or orders. 
The use of international trade terms also help to standardise what are the obligations and 
rights of both sides. 
 
5.2 Supermarket Chains Cases 
Below, it is summarised the main features of the four case studies. 
 
CHAIN  F 
This chain consists of an European retail company that owns a beef processing plant in 
Southern Brazil. It co-ordinates a large number of beef producers and follows the same 
production standards used in Europe. There is cognitive trust between these them. 
 
CHAIN H 
This chain consists of a large Brazilian retail company with 25% of participation of an 
European group. This supermarket develops its own Quality Assurance scheme, which gives 
assistance to the suppliers on meeting the standards. The beef processor produces for the 
supermarket’s own brand. The standards are based on international guidelines and also have 
environmental and safety concerns. 
 
CHAIN I 
The key agent is a national owned retailer with a reputation for high quality products. It was a 
pioneer on developing own brand beef. It imposes to its suppliers the same standards of the 
Hilton quota, those used to have special treatment in the European Union market. 
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CHAIN J 
This chain consists of an European retailer co-ordinating eight beef processors and 34 beef 
producers to produce own brand beef. The retailer provides technical and market assistance to 
the suppliers. 
 
Supermarkets have been pressuring all suppliers to use contracts, to comply with their 
own standards and lower prices. This relationship has reputation and brand as the main 
specificities. There is a certain resistance, especially from processors, but first movers 
identified good and bad results. Supermarkets organise meetings with supply chain to explain 
their guidelines and standards of their own-brand (cases H and J). Likewise, in these 
meetings, there are discussions about changes in demand, trends and similar issues. The size 
and expertise of supermarkets qualify them as natural chain governors. These meetings are 
breaking the traditional mistrust, bringing along all links. Consequently, producers and 
processors are sharing ideas and working for a common aim. All supermarkets interviewed 
declare that their price formation is made based on the competitors, investigating other 
supermarket’s price. This is one example of the increasing competition due to the 
concentration in this link. Therefore, all supermarkets studied follow the same strategy, 
adopting best practices developed by large transnational retail chains. When supplying the 
own-brand, processors have tighter margin and MUST follow supermarket’s rule. On the 
other hand, when selling processor’s brand, it has to cover up costs such as sales promotion 
and advertising. And it also competes against the supermarket own brand beef.  
Supermarket’s food standards are slightly based on international ones. Their main 
concern, however, is setting the extrinsic cues such as colour, cleanness, and tenderness, 
among others. But safety and environmental issues are also considered on the guidelines made 
by the three transnational retail groups (H, J and F). Common practices of all supermarkets 
own brand scheme is the existence of a professional (most cases, a vet) responsible for 
monitoring the beef production, visiting farms, at least, three times per year. For the beef 
producer, scheme guideline sets standards on the following issues: pastures, water 
management, labour, facilities, fences, weighing and cattle transport. Supermarkets exercise 
executive governance throughout the chain and stimulate integration of all links. 
Producers are willing to join supermarkets own brand scheme because they trust 
supermarket’s reputation. As most of them are also consumers on these supermarkets, they are 
perceived as wealthy and trustworthiness. This is a contrast of the general perception over 
processors. One beef producer that supplies a supermarket’s own brand chain says that 
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scheme did not mean extra costs because his breed is genetically adequate to the main 
standards. For him, the main change was to adopt the sustainable environmental requirements. 
Both supermarket and producer agreed on a time to make all the necessary changes such as 
erosion control, maintenance of green areas and wild life, pasture rotation and so on. The 
owner of this property emphasises the advantages of being part of this scheme as “the 
professionalism of the supermarket chain and the assistance on management issues”. The 
bigger amount of information given by the supermarket allows a better knowledge of the 
whole business. Supermarkets also look stable and honest to the beef producers and, some of 
them, declared of being proud of being part of their chains. Likewise, processors also trust 
supermarkets’ reputation however they complain about the tight margins and the little bargain 
power. The own brand supply chain creates interdependence between the links. This can be 
paradoxical and, in that over time, retailers become more reliant on their suppliers who 
become the providers of brand integrity and have the capacity to innovate and add value.  
 
6 DISCUSSION 
Beef producers affirm to prefer selling to supermarket because they trust that they will 
receive a fair payment. In addition, the tangible of the supermarkets facilities is important for 
the producer. Usually, he is not only a supplier but also a consumer of the supermarket. On 
the other hand, importers are global sourcers and have the reputation of purchasing from 
cheapest possible price. The international wholesalers, on the other hand, face cultural 
barriers. There is little understanding of the difference of domestic and the EU market, for 
example. During the interviews, beef processors showed little satisfaction about their 
participation on the decision making on both channels.  
Findings point out the role of export and supermarket food standards for the supply 
chain organisation. While export standards are compulsory and there is no transfer of learning 
through the chain, supermarkets have their own brand, setting their own standards, that can be 
similar to the international ones, but with local adaptation. The export standards drive to 
judicial governance and supermarket standards require executive governance. The existence 
of trust or mistrust could be detected through the speeches of the interviewees. This study 
split trust in two different kind: cognitive and affective; and in different levels: characteristic 
based, process based and institutional based. Cognitive trust is more common and shows the 
formation of alliances as a strategy of business survival or expansion.  
Due to cultural differences, distance and bad experiences, importers are not 
considerable completely trustworthy because they do not own facilities in the country. 
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Affective trust associated to cognitive is leading processors to promote horizontal alliances 
(Brazilian beef and Southern Brazilian beef). The level of trust is based on characteristics or 
process. Institutional trust is still incipient in Brazilian business environment. Tradition and 
past habits are strong factors to transactions practices, especially to those processors and 
producers located on rural areas. These findings suggest that market efficiency could be 
improved by setting up supportive institutions to reduce opportunism and favour more 
trusting business practices. Institutional safeguards could change the lack of trust or, the 
assumption of opportunism. The compliance with export standards (specially process) and 
transnational retailers affects chains calling for “business” oriented behaviour to survive. The 
cases suggest that standards appear as the main drivers of these changes. Supermarkets are 
also supplying new products, trying to added value to products. They transfer knowledge 
establishing a guideline to beef producers and processors, exercising executive governance. 
On the other hand, they squeeze out the market margins. 
It is interesting to note that the increasing of trust within the chains is due to the 
executive governance exercised by the supermarket, which looks trustworthy for the two 
other members analysed, beef processor and beef producer. Retailers suffer the pressure of 
international competitors and differentiated products and are co-ordinating its chain to 
respond to it. Both marketing channels are characterised as buyer driven chains. Different 
agents in different forms exercise governance. Export chains rely on MAPA’s legislative 
governance setting and monitoring the compliance with international standards. Supermarkets 
chain are governed by supermarkets and built over the full compliance with private standards. 
Findings suggest that supermarkets are the governors that stimulate the creation of cognitive 
based trust process (reputation, brand). 
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
The Brazilian beef chain has been increasingly responding to complex and strict food 
standards. Export chain is supported by public sector and there is no problem for beef 
exporters to adapt to food controls. However, there are little product differentiation and 
benefits transmitted throughout the chain. On the other hand, supermarkets are leading the 
changes within the domestic market. They are trying to differentiate their products through 
the establishment, implementation and monitoring of standards to their suppliers. Their 
executive governance is, in a way, replacing the Brazilian domestic food control. The 
country’s focuses on agricultural products export lead to the constant upgrade of export-
driven products food control systems. 
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Export chains are less likely to develop trust. An explanation is that, while 
supermarket standards require an institutional trust, export standards are compulsory. Then, 
agents do not realise the need of development of trust to comply with standards though results 
show that all chains are able to comply. The compliance can be easily obtained within a 
trustworthy chain (NORTHEN and HENSON, 1999) but it is true that those without have also 
been complying with food standards. Different levels and kinds of trust were found in these 
chains. Export chains have the first set of relations featured as cognitive trust based on 
institutional and process within processor and importers. The other relationship, between 
producer and processor, when there is trust because of locational proximity, it is affective and 
based on characteristic. Supermarkets are also buyer driven chains with cognitive trust based 
on process. The trustworthiness throughout the whole chain relies on the governor’s 
reputation. In sum, there are different ways to develop relationships. Cognitive trust can may 
never develop to affect based trust but still the relationship can be fruitful. But the creation of 
trust is fundamental for the development of alliances and partnerships. Those opportunistic 
agents have to change their behaviour and act honestly to be able to be trustee. To sustain 
international competitiveness, an agent must exercise the executive governance. This role can 
be played by an internal agent (codes of practices e.g. supermarket own brand), but, 
preferably, by an external agent for legislative and enforcement mechanisms (governmental) 
supported by reputation. 
This study has the limitations of assessing a small number of case studies and using 
basically qualitative data. The results of the study are descriptive and exploratory and it is 
suggested further research to verify if production of trust happens in the same direction in 
same or other sectors in other countries. New studies could test correlations between 
independent variables (e.g. trust) and dependent variable (kind of governance). 
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